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NOTE   
 
GENETIC PLASTIC SURGERY: HOW NEOEUGENICS  
CREATES A CULTURE OF STAGE MOMS 
 
JAMES A. LONG∗  
INTRODUCTION  
The developments being made in the area of genetic engineering foster 
as many promises as they do cautions. If these developments continue, 
bioengineers will have the ability, like never before, to completely alter 
entire gene pools.1 Given this awesome, and somewhat frightening 
potential, the law must be ready to address these neoeugenic procedures 
such as genetic engineering and their proper limits within society. 
Neoeugentics, when used for cosmetic purposes and even for certain non-
cosmetic purposes, can and should be regulated by states because it directly 
violates the personal autonomy of the unborn child, indirectly violates the 
personal autonomy of mothers, and it satisfies the Supreme Court’s 
compelling state interest test.  
Legislators are faced with a number of considerations when deciding if 
and to what extent neoeugenic procedures should be regulated or even 
required. Among these are the woman’s autonomy in making reproductive 
decisions, the subjectivity of the unborn child, the degree to which the 
police powers would allow the state to require neoeugenic procedures, and 
whether there is a compelling state interest that would justify a regulation of 
neoeugenics. One immediate example is evidence that a directive approach 
(meaning gene therapy is expressly recommended) compromises a 
woman’s autonomy;2 therefore, a legislator can support a regulation of 
 
  ∗    California State University, San Bernadino, Bachelor of Arts  - Philosophy, University of 
St. Thomas, JD candidate 2010  
 1. See, e.g., Susannah Baruch et al., Genetics and Public Policy Center, Human Germline 
Genetic Modification: Issues and Options for Policymakers 14 (2005), available at 
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/HumanGermlineGeneticMod.pdf. 
 2. See Sonia M. Suter, A Brave New World of Designer Babies?, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
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neoeugenics requiring doctors to take a non-directive approach (meaning 
the doctor merely informs the patient of her options) in order to respect the 
woman’s autonomy. This paper attempts to provide a framework for 
dealing with these types of considerations. Given this country’s colorful 
history in the eugenics era, building a solid legal framework will help 
ensure that the mistakes of the past are not revisited.  
Through an analysis of the history of eugenics and its modern 
counterparts, Section I of this paper will illustrate that neoeugenics is not 
insulated from the mistakes of the past, as its proponents claim. Rather, 
modern programs such as genetic engineering, contraception, and prenatal 
testing are haunted by the same racist and elitist overtones as compulsory 
sterilization and marriage-prohibition laws.3 Section II will analyze the 
principle of autonomy and demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s 
conception of autonomy is premised upon a false anthropology. Section III 
will examine the extent to which the state can regulate neoeugenics 
consistent with a compelling state interest. 
A parent’s decision to choose genetic engineering for their child is 
likely to be considered a fundamental reproductive right, and any regulation 
of neoeugenics will, therefore, be subject to strict scrutiny. Although I 
propose several compelling interests, two stand paramount: preserving 
patient autonomy and preserving the unborn child’s autonomy. First, the 
autonomy of the patient requires that doctors adopt a non-directive 
approach to genetic counseling. Second, to the extent that neoeugenic 
procedures assume the life or birth of an unborn child, the child’s autonomy 
interests become increasingly relevant.  
I. HISTORY OF EUGENICS 
Despite its “good” etymology,4 fewer words are charged with more 
negative history than the word “eugenics.” It has traveled along the road of 
good intentions since the late nineteenth century, leaving in its wake 
oppression, racism, coercion, and genocide. Championed by the United 
States as a means to ensure ethnic purity, eugenics inspired the Asian 
Exclusion Act,5 the forced sterilization of more than 60,000 people, and 
 
897, 919–20, 924–28 (2007) [hereinafter Suter, Designer Babies] (commenting on the effects of a 
directive approach).  
 3. This analysis is not intended to support a theory that marriage prohibition laws and 
compulsory sterilization are morally equivalent to genetic engineering, prenatal testing, and 
contraception. I simply wish to underscore the fact that neoeugenics is, sadly, motivated by the 
same stereotypes and elitism which inspired the universally decried eugenics of the 1920’s—albeit 
at an individual rather than state level. The cause for such persistent motivations is the policy of 
“crypto-eugenics” which replaced eugenics in aftermath of World War II.  
 4. The word eugenics literally means “good birth.” 
 5. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153. 
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restricted marriages for the “feebleminded.”6 Adolph Hitler was inspired by 
U.S. policies and sterilized 3.5 million “undesireables” before he 
implemented the “final solution.”7 In the aftermath of World War II and the 
horrors of the Holocaust, the United States began to abandon its official 
eugenics program—or so it seemed.8 While many of the official eugenic 
programs were dissolved, some remained under the guise of “reproductive 
rights.”9 
Now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, eugenics is more alive 
than ever. Many scholars attempt to distinguish the eugenics of old versus 
the “neoeugenics” of the modern era, with some making a distinction 
between positive versus negative eugenics and others defending 
neoeugenics as a fundamental reproductive right.10 Proponents of 
neoeugenics believe that, by correcting the false science of the early 
twentieth century and removing the instruments of eugenics from the state, 
neoeugenics can offer many of the promising benefits of eugenics without 
the collateral violations of human rights.11  
A. Classic Eugenics 
The word eugenics was first used by Francis Galton, a cousin of 
Charles Darwin, who defined eugenics as: 
[T]he science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to 
questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of 
man, takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote 
a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a 
better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they 
otherwise would have had.12 
 
 6. PHILIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 26–27 (1991). 
 7. Phillip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 204, 210 (2000); see also Suter, Designer 
Babies, supra note 2, at 901–02.  
 8. Cf. MATTHEW CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL 
WORLD POPULATION 112 (2008) [hereinafter CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION] (noting that 
in the aftermath of World War II eugenics as a way to shape populations was not discredited but 
found solid ground in the birth control movement).  
 9. See Note, Regulating Eugenics, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1586–92 (2008) [hereinafter 
Regulating]; see generally CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 104–09; 
MARGARET SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 106–08 (Dover Publications, Inc. 1971) (1938) 
[hereinafter SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY]; MARGARET SANGER, MY FIGHT FOR BIRTH 
CONTROL 83–84 (Maxwell Reprint Company 1969) (1931) [hereinafter SANGER, BIRTH 
CONTROL]. 
 10. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 917; Regulating, supra note 9; 
ANDREA TONE, DEVICES & DESIRES: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVES IN AMERICA 141 (2001).  
 11. See generally, Regulating, supra note 9, at 1582. 
 12. FRANCIS GALTON, INQUIRIES INTO HUMAN FACULTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 17 n.1 
(2d. ed. 1911), reprinted in EVERYMAN’S LIBRARY: SCIENCE (Ernest Rhys ed. 1943).  
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Inspired by Galton’s eugenics, Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh sold 
133,000 copies of Charles Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy—a pamphlet 
that addressed the need to help people have sex without having children.13 
Besant argued in favor of contraception as a way to stop the proliferation of 
the weakest members of society.14 Her notoriety, coupled with powerful 
international advocates,15 helped motivate the developments in 
contraceptive techniques that resulted in the decline of Europe’s 
population.16 
When most countries in Europe adopted military conscription, the 
decline of population became a matter of national security.17 France, for 
example, gave mothers free medical care for childbirth.18 Likewise, 
Germany mandated maternity leave with pay.19 In addition to low birth 
rates between 1870 and 1914, Europe experienced the greatest mass 
emigration of Europeans in history—thirty-two million people.20  
While the European continent suffered dramatic declines in population, 
the United States was experiencing a boom. Receiving immigrants from 
Europe on the east coast and immigrants from Asia on the west, America’s 
population began to increase rapidly.21 Concerned not with the rate of 
growth but with the composition and quality of growth, American eugenic 
activists took aim at the Chinese,22 depicting them as “disease-carrying 
cosmopolitans who excelled in economic competition and conspired to rule 
the world.”23 The Workingman’s Party in California began to campaign for 
immigration reform under the slogan “the Chinese must go!”24 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology president Francis Walker infamously 
 
 13. ROGER MANVELL, THE TRIAL OF ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH 44–47 
(1976); CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
 14. See MANVELL, supra note 13, at 86–92 (Besant drew international attention when she 
and Bradlaugh were convicted of publishing an obscene pamphlet); see also High Court of 
Justice, THE TIMES OF LONDON, June 20, 1877. 
 15. Annie Besant was joined by Margaret Sanger, Elise Ottesen-Jensen, Marie Stopes, 
Baroness Shidzué Ishimoto, and Lady Rama Rau. CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra 
note 8, at 24. 
 16. By 1880, the population of Europe reached its peak and began to decline. See DEBORAH 
DWORK, WAR IS GOOD FOR BABIES AND OTHER YOUNG CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF THE CHILD 
WELFARE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND 1898–1918 3–7 (1987); see also CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 
20. 
 17. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 24; DWORK, supra note 16, at 3. 
 18. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 25. 
 19. Id. 
 20. WALTER NUGENT, CROSSINGS: THE GREAT TRANSATLANTIC MIGRATIONS, 1870–1914 
41–43 (1992); DAVID HELD ET. AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND 
CULTURE 291–92 (1999). 
 21. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 32–34. 
 22. Id. at 32–38. 
 23. Id. at 36. 
 24. ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE 
MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 104–06, 122 (1971).  
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noted that immigrants were “beaten men from beaten races; representing the 
worst failures in the struggle for existence.”25 In his view the “‘vast hordes 
of ignorant and brutalized peasantry’ would depress wages and discourage 
native stocks from forming new families.”26 “Yellow peril” spread to 
Europe as Asian immigrants filled the void of Europe’s declining 
population.  
The population struggles of the western world fueled the science of 
eugenics as eugenicists began to discuss ways of increasing desirable 
populations and decreasing the undesirable.27 Beginning with Germany’s 
Society for Race Hygiene, national organizations emerged to unite 
eugenicists.28 In 1912, London hosted the first international meeting of 
eugenicists.29 Biologist Raymond Pearl30 told the Eugenics Congress that 
politicians and the public should give scientists “a chance at directing the 
course of human evolution.”31  
As the promises of eugenics became apparent its popularity grew. By 
1910, the Index for Periodical Literature placed eugenics as the second most 
popular topic in print media.32 Eugenics’ popularity provided a favorable 
political climate for passing eugenic laws, and the United States became the 
first country to pass laws aimed at reducing the fertility of “ethnic 
minorities, the poor, [and the] otherwise ‘unfit.’”33 Connecticut spearheaded 
the eugenic laws movement by passing the first marriage prohibition law in 
1896.34 In 1907, Indiana became the first state to pass a sterilization law, 
and, by 1917, fifteen more states followed suit.35 Altogether, more than 
 
 25. Francis A. Walker, Restriction of Immigration, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1896, at 
822–29; CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
 26. Walker, supra note 25, at 822–29; CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 38. 
 27. Cf. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 50. 
 28. Id. at 43. 
 29. Id.; see also, First Eugenics Congress: Four Hundred Delegates In London—Americans 
to Read Papers, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1912, at 5.  
 30. Pearl was one of the highest paid professors at Johns Hopkins and a member of the 
governing councils of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council. 
 31. Raymond Pearl, The First International Eugenics Congress, 36 SCIENCE 395 (1912). 
 32. Phillip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 205 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman 
eds. 2000). Not only was eugenics represented in popular literature but it also was represented in 
popular culture. For example, the American Eugenics Society began hosting “fitter family” 
competitions in the “human stock” sections at state fairs. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF 
EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 61–62 (1985). 
 33. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 49. 
 34. KEVLES, supra note 32, at 99.  By 1914, thirty states passed marriage prohibition laws for 
“idiots,” the insane, “feebleminded,” “unfit,” and those afflicted with venereal disease. Indiana’s 
law passed in 1905 forbade the marriages of mentally deficient and drunkards because it was 
thought that they carried a “transmittable disease.” Id.  
 35. KEVLES, supra note 32, at 100. Iowa passed the broadest sterilization law which 
“compelled the sterilization of twice-convicted sexual offenders, of thrice-convicted other felons, 
and of anyone convicted just once of involvement in white slavery.” Madison Grant—a New York 
lawyer and treasurer for the second and third international eugenics conferences—argued that 
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60,000 people fell victim to compulsory sterilization laws—7,500 in 
California alone.36 Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1924,37 which 
resulted in “not just a drastic reduction in immigration from southern and 
eastern Europe, but the expulsion of immigrants [who] the courts did not 
consider to be white and the forced sale or seizure of their property.”38 The 
United States’ aggressive eugenic legislation did not go unnoticed by 
European countries—especially Nazi Germany.  
American eugenic laws encouraged Nazi Germany to implement 
increasingly radical measures.39 Adolph Hitler praised American 
immigration restrictions in Mein Kampf and Nazi sterilization laws gave 
public praise to American eugenic pioneers.40 Hitler explained that the 
“planned control of population movements” was necessary to preserve the 
quality and quantity of the Aryan race.41 American eugenicists voiced their 
support for Hitler’s race policy.42 Senior representative of the American 
eugenics movement in Berlin, Clarence Campbell, for example, stated that 
Hitler’s eugenic programs “[set] the pattern which other nations and other 
racial groups must follow.”43 In the aftermath of World War II and its 
atrocities, American eugenicists began to distance themselves from the 
classic eugenic policies that inspired Nazi Germany.44 
 
sterilization offered “a practical, merciful and inevitable solution” to the problem of a wide circle 
of “social discards” including “the criminal, the diseased and the insane [as well as] . . . weaklings 
. . . [and] worthless race types.” MADISON GRANT, THE PASSING OF THE GREAT RACE: OR, THE 
RACIAL BASIS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY 51 (2d ed. 1918).  
 36. Reilly, supra note 32. For California, see CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 48. The most 
infamous compulsory sterilization was Carrie Buck who was sterilized in 1927 after the United 
States Supreme Court validated Virginia’s compulsory sterilization statute. See Buck v. Bell, 247 
U.S. 200 (1927). Carrie Buck died in 1983. On May 2, 2002 the State of Virginia erected a 
historical marker at Carrie Buck’s birthplace. At the dedication, Virginia Governor Mark R. 
Warner offered the “Commonwealth’s sincere apology for Virginia's participation in eugenics.” 
Dave Reynolds, The Eugenics Apologies: How a Pair of Disability Rights Advocates Scored the 
First State Apology for Eugenics, and What They Have Planned Next, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE, 
Nov.–Dec. 2003, http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/1103/1103ft1.html. 
 37. It is also known as the “National Origins Act of 1924” and the “Asian Exclusion Act of 
1924.” See note 5. 
 38. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 48. Before the Immigration Act of 1924, immigrants from 
eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey) were emigrating to the U.S. at a rate of 
15,000 people per year. After the Act, their immigration was limited to 1,500 per year. Likewise, 
Italian immigrants averaged 92,000 per year before the Act and 7,000 after. U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 56 (1960). 
 39. Cf. STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND 
GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 23–26 (1994); CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 
8, at 105. The Nazi sterilization law enacted in 1933 resulted in the forced sterilization of 3.5 
million people and led to the secret euthanistic killing of the disabled. See Reilly, supra note 32.  
 40. ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 439–40 (Ralph Manheim trans., Houghton Mifflin 1971) 
(1925). On sterilization see KÜHL, supra note 39, at 37–39. 
 41. HERMANN RAUSCHNING, THE VOICE OF DESTRUCTION 136–38 (1940). 
 42. See generally KÜHL, supra note 39, at 27–37. 
 43. Id. at 34. 
 44. Id. at 100; see also TONE, supra note 10, at 144. 
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B. Classic Eugenics to Crypto-eugenics 
Despite outward signs that eugenic programs were closing, many of the 
policies still remained operative. For example, the Immigration Act of 1924 
was not repealed until 1965,45 and, while the Eugenics Record Office was 
officially closed in 1939 and people no longer received “feebleminded” 
diagnoses, mandatory eugenic sterilizations continued until 1983.46 Many 
eugenicists sought legitimacy by forging alliances with birth controllers and 
pronatalists47 to regain popular support—a move Margaret Sanger, the 
founder of Planned Parenthood, had desired since she coined the term “birth 
control” in 1914.48 
Sanger desperately sought recognition and support from eugenic 
scientists.49 She believed that the growth of her birth control movement 
depended on “promoting birth control not merely as a personal choice, but 
as a public good.”50 Insisting “there has never been any birth control 
movement that did not lay stress on the eugenic side of it,”51 Sanger was 
successful in convincing eugenicists Edward East and Raymond Pearl that 
“providing the poor and ethnic minorities with birth control would reduce 
differential fertility.”52 Agreeing with Sanger’s analysis, Pearl said 
It is not only desirable in the eugenic interest of the race to cut 
down, indeed completely extinguish, the high birth rate of the unfit 
and defective portions of mankind, but it is also desirable . . . to 
reduce the birth rate of the poor, even though that unfortunate 
moiety of humanity be in every way biologically sound and fit.53 
With the help of Pearl and East,54 Sanger was able to network with medical 
 
 45. The Immigration Act of 1924 was repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). 
 46. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 917. On eugenic sterilizations see Reilly, 
supra note 32, at 211 (“Although one cannot point to a moment in which state-sanctioned 
eugenical sterilization in the United States ended, a satisfactory date is 1983 when a class-action 
lawsuit brought by women in Virginia who had been sterilized without their consent while in state 
facilities was settled.”); See Poe v. Lynchburg, 518 F.Supp. 789 (1978). 
 47. The SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines “pronatalist” as “[o]f or pertaining 
to the encouragement of the practice of having a large family, esp. by the State; advocating large 
families.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 2366 (5th ed. 
2002). 
 48. See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 51, 53–54, 105–06; SANGER, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 
supra note 9, at 107–09; (Sanger tried several names before deciding on “birth control” such as 
“race control” and “family control”); see also Sanger, BIRTH CONTROL, supra note 9, at 83. 
 49. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 51–54. 
 50. Id. at 43. 
 51. Id. at 53; see generally TONE, supra note 10, at 145. 
 52. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that Sanger also suggested parents should be 
required to apply for babies as immigrants applied for visas). 
 53. RAYMOND PEARL, THE BIOLOGY OF POPULATION GROWTH 171 (1925). 
 54. East claimed that birth control is essential to a successful eugenic program and advocated 
“promot[ing] birth control at the lower end of the social scale.” See EDWARD M. EAST, MANKIND 
AT THE CROSSROADS 299, 303 (1923). 
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doctors, including the leaders of the Committee on Maternal Health and the 
American Medical Association.55  
Aiding the birth control movement was the economic crisis of the Great 
Depression.56 With millions unemployed and parents struggling to provide 
for their families, “it began to appear ludicrous to deny them the means to 
prevent unwanted births. . . . [T]here was increasingly an expectation that 
parents should have no more children than they could manage.”57 With 
popular support, and medical and scientific backing, Sanger’s birth control 
movement was able to solidify support and legitimacy among population 
activists such as Gunnar and Alva Myrdal and Sir William Beveridge. 
Together, they created the “family planning” movement.58  
According to the Myrdals “[t]he genius of family planning was to imply 
that parents would do the planning” while in reality “social engineers” 
would “create the conditions that would shape parents’ preferences (and in 
some cases compel more rational choices).”59 For many eugenicists, the 
“future of family planning depended on their ability to manipulate a large 
segment of society they considered to be unfit for parenthood.”60 As C. P. 
Blacker61 wrote, “defectives being, for the most part, readily suggestible 
and open to the influence of the people around them, should in most cases 
be easily persuaded.”62 
Under the leadership of C.P. Blacker, the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation63 began a policy of “crypto-eugenics” in which 
 
 55. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 63. In 1937, family planning under a doctor’s supervision 
received the seal of approval of the American Medical Association. See id. at 109. 
 56. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 107. See also TONE, supra note 10, at 151. 
 57. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 83 (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. at 82; see also LINDA GORDON, WOMAN’S BODY, WOMAN’S RIGHT: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA 344–48 (1977). 
 59. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 104. This approach is similar to the “fitter family” 
competitions during the late 1920’s. 
 60. Id. at 107 (citing Alva Myrdal, The Swedish Approach to Population Policies, 30 J. 
HEREDITY 113 (1939)). 
 61. C.P. Blacker was chosen by Margaret Sanger as the first director of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).  
 62. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 107. The family planning movement acted as a catalyst to 
blunt the negative effects the Holocaust should have had on eugenics. In fact, Margaret Sanger 
used the holocaust to justify eugenics in a speech delivered to the Planned Parenthood Federation 
of America, pointing to “the death camps as conclusive proof of the ‘widespread devaluation of 
human lives’ and the urgent need for policies to improve them, beginning with the sterilization of 
those with ‘dysgenic qualities of body and mind.’” See id. at 167–68. 
 63. The Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) was founded by Margaret Sanger 
in 1923 under the incorporated name of the “American Birth Control League” (ABCL) when 
Sanger opened her first birth control clinic in Brooklyn, New York. The ABCL changed its name 
to PPFA in 1942. See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 109. The International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (IPPF) was founded by Margaret Sanger in 1952 just two years after her speech to the 
thirteenth annual Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA). Together, the IPPF and 
PPFA form the entity formally known as “Planned Parenthood.” See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 
167–68. 
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“[y]ou seek to fulfill the aims of eugenics without disclosing what you are 
really aiming at and without mentioning the word.”64 The Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America used a similar strategy—its director, 
William Vogt, for instance, carefully disguised an anti-Asian policy as a 
maternal health policy.65 
The family planning movement gave eugenicists the mantel of personal 
autonomy to disguise their racist and elitist agendas. This was particularly 
true in the United States where Dutch “sex reformers” considered 
“Americans to be ‘obsessed’ . . . with ‘attacking population problems, and 
especially those of coloured people.’”66 What differentiated eugenics from 
family planning was not its objectives, but rather the means which it 
employed to achieve its objectives.67 By taking the eugenic instruments out 
of the hands of the state and giving them to private institutions, eugenicists 
now had the basis for claiming eugenics as a reproductive right.68 This 
difference caused some scholars to refer to this new movement as 
neoeugenics.69  
 
 64. CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 163. 
 65. Id. at 165–66 (“It is commonly said in the Orient that we want to cut their population 
because we are afraid of them . . . but the program can be sold on the basis of the mother’s health 
and the health of the other children.”). 
 66. Id. Margaret Sanger openly targeted the poor while maintaining “life is so easy and 
charming and warm and bright for those who have money.” See CONNELLY, supra note 8, at 99. 
See also Brief Impressions of Japan (Apr. 10, 1922), in THE MARGARET SANGER PAPERS (Esther 
Katz et al. eds.), microfilmed on THE MARGARET SANGER PAPERS, Reel 70, Fiche 110–20 (1996); 
cf. TONE, supra note 10, at 145–46. 
 67. Both the family planning movement and eugenics sought to reduce the fertility rates of 
minorities and otherwise unfit, the difference being family planning sought to convince 
individuals to sterilize themselves (i.e., choose birth control) and eugenicists sought state-
mandated sterilizations. See, e.g., CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION, supra note 8, at 107 
(discussing the need for the family planning movement to manipulate large populations of the 
“unfit”); cf. TONE, supra note 10, at 144–46 (discussing birth control as a way to racial 
improvement). 
 68. The history of reproductive rights in America centers on the ideals of personal autonomy 
and individual freedom. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 851 (1992). When the eugenic movement began to shy away from state-mandated 
eugenics and focus on private institutions like Planned Parenthood, eugenicists could then 
articulate why their methods should be seen as consistent with personal autonomy and individual 
freedom, thus paving the way for eugenic programs like abortion, contraception, and prenatal 
testing to be considered fundamental reproductive rights. See the discussion infra p ### on crypto-
eugenics for a fuller discussion. 
 69. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 922.  
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C. Crypto-eugenics to Neoeugenics70 
The founder of eugenics, Francis Galton, never supported compulsory 
eugenic programs. Rather, he believed that if the public was properly 
educated, they could be trusted to make the right eugenic reproductive 
decisions.71 Galton’s optimism is reflected in the neoeugenics movement. 
Neoeugenics is best described as a “voluntary improvement of the human 
species at the individual level.”72 Although many agree that there are 
similarities between neoeugenics and classic eugenics, they argue that 
neoeugenics (unlike classic eugenics) is morally justifiable because its 
focus is on autonomy and individual freedom rather than state-compelled 
sterilization.73 Yet some scholars believe that crypto-eugenic policies still 
influence neoeugenics. Professor Suter of George Washington University 
Law School writes: 
[A]lthough the choice is always the individual’s, pressures from 
providers and society may have coercive effects. In the era of 
compulsory sterilizations, efforts were made to persuade 
individuals to make particular reproductive choices. Likewise, in 
the midst of the voluntarism of neoeugenics, efforts are made to 
persuade individuals to make particular reproductive choices. Thus, 
although the landscapes of eugenics and neoeugenics are clearly 
different, the distinctions are not as extreme as commentators often 
suggest.74 
The problem with neoeugenics is not that it attempts to achieve some of 
the same ends as classic eugenics. After all, the classic eugenics movement 
did actually seek some valid ends, such as the eradication of diseases. The 
problem with neoeugenics is that, since its implementation in the 1930’s, 
crypto-eugenics has created the social pressures that shape our reproductive 
choices.75 For example, one scholar recognized that when “‘choices’ 
become available, they all too rapidly become compulsions to ‘choose’ the 
socially endorsed alternative.”76 This compulsion to choose the socially 
 
 70. The term neoeugenics will be defined as found in Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2. 
While many scholars use different terms, I believe they all describe the same thing. Some use 
positive versus negative eugenics; some call the new eugenics movement “liberal eugenics” 
because it “advocates genetic modification of humans on liberal political grounds.” Regulating, 
supra note 9, at 1582. I have chosen to use the term neoeugenics because I believe that it 
accurately describes the movement.  
 71. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 922. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Regulating, supra note 9, at 1582; cf. Lene Koch, The Meaning of Eugenics: 
Reflections on the Government of Genetic Knowledge in the Past and the Present, 17 SCI. IN 
CONTEXT 315, 317 (2004). 
 74. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 938. 
 75. Cf. Ruth Hubbard, Legal and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal 
Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 201, 210 (1982). 
 76. Id. 
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endorsed alternative is most profoundly demonstrated in the area of prenatal 
testing (discussed infra in Section II).77  
Before a legal framework can be laid to deal with neoeugenics, an 
outline of the kinds of neoeugenic procedures currently or potentially 
available should be discussed. Below is a discussion of five neoeugenic 
procedures.  
1. Amniocentisis and Choronic Villus Sampling 
Some of the most common procedures of the neoeugenic era are 
diagnostic tests such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling,78 
which, due to numerous social pressures, have become a routine part of 
pregnancy.79  
2. Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis  
One option gaining momentum is preimplantation genetic diagnosis of 
embryos created through in vitro fertilization. Once an embryo is tested and 
found to be free of “genetic abnormalities,” it can be “transferred to the 
woman’s uterus for gestation.”80 But, like prenatal testing, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis is not a treatment for disease; rather, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis merely “overcomes some of the emotional complications 
associated with prenatal testing and termination. . . . [T]hose who believe 
that life begins at conception may still be troubled by the prospect of 
embryo destruction if the embryo is found to carry disease genes.”81 
Another developing area of neoeugenics will reduce the cost of testing and 
make “prenatal diagnosis even more desirable and broader in its scope.”82 
3. DNA Chips 
In less than a decade, “next-generation technologies that make reading 
DNA fast, cheap and widely accessible” will become available.83 Michael J. 
 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 210; see generally Sonia Mateu Suter, The Routinization of Prenatal 
Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 255–57 (2002) [hereinafter Suter, Routinization]. 
 78. Amniocentesis is a “procedure in which a small sample of amniotic fluid is drawn out of 
the uterus through a needle inserted in the abdomen and is then analyzed to detect genetic 
abnormalities in the fetus or to determine the sex of the fetus.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 36 (2d ed. 2004). Chorionic villus sampling is a “prenatal test 
to detect birth defects that is performed at an early stage of pregnancy and involves retrieval and 
examination of tissue from the chorionic villi.” Id. at 153. Chorionic villi are any of the “fingerlike 
projections of the chorion of the embryo.” Id.  
 79. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 923; see also Suter, Routinization, supra, note 
77, at 255–56.  
 80. Jeffrey R. Botkin, Ethical Issues and Practical Problems in Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 17 (1998). 
 81. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 930–31. 
 82. Id. at 931. 
 83. George M. Church, Genomes for All, SCI. AM., Jan. 2006, at 47. 
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Malinowski describes “DNA chips” that “can be used to test the samples of 
individuals for the presence of thousands of identified genetic variations.”84 
In essence, scientists will know the type of child two people will have 
before an embryo is even created. But these procedures do nothing to treat 
genetic diseases; they only provide evidence of genetic abnormalities. Gene 
therapy and gene transfer, on the other hand, have the potential to treat 
some genetic diseases.85  
4. Gene Therapy and Transfer 
Despite neoeugenicists’ optimism, the science of gene therapy has 
progressed very little since the 1990’s.86 This may be due, at least partially, 
to the debate among neoeugenicists over its potential uses. Apart from 
merely treating diseases, gene therapy could be used to enhance healthy 
genes by altering them to improve height and athleticism, or even cosmetic 
enhancements like facial structure and eye color.87 These enhancements are 
advocated by scholars such as Professor Ronald Dworkin,88 who justifies 
genetic enhancements on philosophical grounds: he argues that society is 
morally obligated to provide genetic enhancements so that children can 
choose broader life plans and have a greater chance of success.89  
The technology may become so advanced that gene therapists could 
choose to manipulate genes at the somatic cell level (making the 
enhancements uninheritable) or at the germline level (making the genetic 
alterations inheritable).90 With this technology, neoeugenicists could 
actually achieve what they set out to do in the 20s and 30s—eradicate 
unwanted gene sequences (albeit at the individual, rather than the state, 
level).91  
5. Human Genome Project 
Complimenting gene therapy are developments in the Human Genome 
 
 84. Michael J. Malinowski, Law, Policy, and Market Implications of Genetic Profiling in 
Drug Development, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 31, 40–41 (2002). 
 85. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 933. 
 86. Id. at 932. 
 87. Id. at 933–34, n.195. 
 88. Ronald Dworkin is a Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London and New 
York University School of Law. UCL Faculty of Laws, Ronald Dworkin, 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/index.shtml?dworkin (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
 89. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 
448–52 (2000). 
 90. Susannah Baruch et al., Genetics and Public Policy Center, Human Germline Genetic 
Modification: Issues and Options for Policymakers 14 (2005), http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/ 
reportpdfs/HumanGermlineGeneticMod.pdf (“If and when it occurs, germline genetic 
modification would involve introducing a new genetic sequence into a person's germline cells that 
could be passed to future generations.”). See generally id. at 13–24. 
 91. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 937–38. 
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Project. The late Daniel E. Koshland, former Editor-in-Chief of Science, 
hypothesized that the Human Genome Project had the potential to provide 
solutions to many of today’s social problems, such as homelessness and 
crime, by eliminating the illnesses which in large part lead to them.92 This 
medicalization of social problems—casting them as primarily genetic—is 
strikingly similar to the position espoused by classic eugenicists. 93 
As these new age technologies become mainstream, the social pressures 
to use them will increase.94 These social pressures affect neoeugenics to the 
extent that they impair the autonomous choices of people who use 
neoeugenic procedures.95 Therefore, while neoeugenics is rooted in the 
ideals of personal autonomy and informed consent, the choices that 
motivate neoeugenic treatments are the aggregate result of what social 
engineers have predetermined constitutes the good.96  
II. THE HUMAN PERSON AND AUTONOMY 
Personal autonomy plays a central role in due process jurisprudence. It 
is difficult to assess however, the importance personal autonomy plays in 
rendering a decision. For example, the Supreme Court in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey implied that everything 
under the sun is encompassed by the due process clause because “[a]t the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”97 But, in 
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court adamantly downplayed the role of 
autonomy in due process jurisprudence opining: “That many of the rights 
and liberties protected by the due process clause sound in personal 
autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.”98 However, in 
Lawrence v. Texas the Court again reiterated the sweet mystery of life and 
held that personal autonomy is a core liberty interest at the heart of the due 
process clause.99 One thing is certain: courts will always struggle with 
balancing personal autonomy on one hand with the state’s interests on the 
 
 92. Koshland hypothesized that psychological disorders such as schizophrenia and the like 
are responsible for many social problems including homelessness. The Human Genome Project 
may rid society of social problems to the extent that it can ameliorate or obliterate the 
psychological disorders that cause such social problems. Daniel E. Koshland, Sequences and 
Consequences of the Human Genome, 246 SCIENCE 189 (1989).  
 93. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 940.  
 94. See Suter, Routinization, supra note 77, at 255–57. 
 95. E.g., id. at 255 (“. . . [e]ven when women understand conceptually that they have a 
choice, social norms and beliefs about what is best for their child may make choice illusive”). 
 96. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the “routinization” of prenatal testing creates a situation 
where “true choice often gives way to the illusion of choice”). 
 97. Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 98. 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997). 
 99. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).  
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other. If neoeugenic procedures qualify as a fundamental right protected by 
the due process clause, then overcoming a state regulation of neoeugenics 
requires walking that delicate balance.  
This section demonstrates how our conception of autonomy is false 
and, therefore, to the extent that the Court would rely on this false 
conception, it is wrong. This section implores the Court to move from an 
“atomistic” conception of autonomy and move towards a “relational” 
autonomy. It also argues that, as a matter of public policy, doctors should 
refrain from taking a directive approach when proscribing neoeugenic 
procedures, and legislators should prohibit cosmetic genetic enhancements.  
Professor Suter points out that “[o]ur culture seems to have adopted an 
‘atomistic conception of self-definition, in which the individual shapes 
herself without reference to others.’”100 The Supreme Court has adopted this 
atomistic view in Casey and Lawrence.101 But the atomistic conception of 
autonomy is flawed to the extent it assumes that human persons act in 
isolation from each other.  
Analyzing this atomistic conception of autonomy requires evaluating 
what it means to be a person.102 Once one understands the nature of the 
human person, a truer conception of autonomy emerges. Only with this 
fuller understanding can the implications of genetic engineering be clearly 
seen.  
A. The Subjectivity of the Human Person 
Karol Wojtyla103 begins his analysis of the human person with the 
observation that the person is both a subject and an object of action.104 As a 
subject, the person is “an entity which exists and acts in a certain way.”105 
As an object, the person exists within a world of objects and is an objective 
particular person.106 But the person is not simply a subject; he is a human 
subject with the ability to reason, distinguished from “even the most 
advanced animals by a specific inner self.”107 Unlike animals, a person 
 
 100. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 951 (quoting Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling 
Privacy from Property, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 772 (2004) [hereinafter Suter, 
Disentangling). 
 101. Casey, 505 U.S. 851; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 574. 
 102. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 951. 
 103. Karol Wojtyla was ordained a priest in 1946 and ordained a Bishop in 1958. Elevated to 
Cardinal in 1967, he was later elected 264th Pope of the Catholic Church under the name John 
Paul II. Holy See Press Office, His Holiness John Paul II Short Biography, 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/biography/index.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
 104. KAROL WOJTYLA, LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 21–23 (H. T. Willetts trans., rev. ed. 
1981) (1960). 
 105. Id. at 21. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 22. Human persons do not only act and react in a passive sense; human persons are 
as Boethius described them—individual beings of a rational nature (individua substantia 
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“does not only intercept messages which reach him from the outside world 
and react to them,” rather, the human subject perceives an object and 
because of his inner life, is aware that he perceives an object.108 Thus, he is 
capable of making value judgments about the objects he perceives, or, as 
Wojytla would say, “he strives to assert himself, his ‘I’ [into the world].”109 
Man is a person precisely because of his interior life.110 
By virtue of the specific interior life, the human person has the power 
of self-determination and exercises his subjectivity by free will. The 
collateral effect of the human person’s power of self-determination is this: 
“No one can substitute his act of [free] will for mine.”111 All human 
relationships are predicated upon the principle that each person remains 
independent in his actions.112 Because the human person is not merely the 
subject of action but can at the same time be the object of action, there are 
many ways in which the human person can be “used.” 
To “use” something means to employ some object as a means to an 
end.113 In this sense, the number of objects that a person uses in his daily 
life as a means to an end is potentially limitless. But when he uses other 
persons as a mere means to an end—when he objectifies them—he denies 
them their subjectivity and does violence to their very nature as human 
persons.114 In other words, he denies them their power of self-determination 
and substitutes his will for theirs. Therefore, when the object of a person’s 
action is another human person, he must never use that other person as a 
mere means to his own ends; rather, he must respect that person’s own 
subjectivity—he must treat that person as an end.  
Immanuel Kant came to the same conclusion when he discussed his 
categorical imperative.115 Kant proposes that one must “act in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own persons or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time 
 
rationalis naturae). The human person’s rational nature fosters an interior life or an inner self that 
distinguishes him from even the most advanced animals. Id. 
 108. Id. at 23 
 109. Id. 
 110. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 23. 
 111. Id. at 24. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 25. 
 114. Id. at 27. Not every instance of using another human person does violence to their 
dignity. For example, the employer uses the employee and vice versa. In this type of relationship, 
the employer could easily use the employee as a mere means to an end; but, if they arrange their 
association such that both are ordered to the other’s good, then, even though they may be “using” 
one another as a means to an end, their act of use is actually an act of love. The employee works 
diligently for the good of the employer, and the employer pays a just wage for the good of the 
employee. It is only when people are used as a mere means to an end that an act of usury does 
violence to the dignity of the human person. See id. at 29. 
 115. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 77 (H. J. Paton 
trans., Harper and Rowe, 1964) (1948). 
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as an end.”116 In this way, Kant not only affirms the autonomy of the human 
person, but also implicitly rejects atomistic autonomy. If atomistic 
autonomy were true, then man would only relate to other people as a 
subject of action and not at the same time as an object of action. Since the 
human person is both a subject and object of action, atomistic autonomy is 
necessarily false.  
Personhood is “‘bound up and expressed in relation to others’ and does 
not focus on individual goals that are disaggregated from community and 
personal history.”117 Analysis of neoeugenics through the lens of “relational 
autonomy” focuses on the “development and expression of the relational 
self,” whereas an “atomistic autonomy” analysis focuses on self-definition 
to the exclusion of any relational considerations.118 
B. Relational Autonomy  
Relational autonomy reveals “subtle and contextual” problems with 
neoeugenics apart from its effects on the atomistic self.119 This is important 
particularly in the realm of reproductive decisions that affect not only the 
subject making the decision, but also the object of the decision. In some 
cases, the way in which we exercise our autonomy has profound effects on 
other people. While this is particularly true of the disabled community,120 it 
also affects parents and the types of decisions they make for their 
children.121 If genetic engineering becomes possible, social pressures may 
encourage parents to cosmetically engineer their children, much like social 
pressures encourage parent to undergo prenatal testing.122 Thus, as a matter 
of public policy, doctors and medical boards should refrain from taking a 
directive approach in prescribing neoeugenic procedures and should restrict 
neoeugenic procedures like genetic engineering when used for cosmetic 
purposes.  
1. The Disability Rights Approach  
Like eugenics of old mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Professor 
 
 116. Id. at 96. 
 117. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 953 (quoting Suter, Disentangling, supra note 
100, at 763). 
 118. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 954. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Darrin P. Dixon, Informed Consent or Institutionalized Eugenics? How the 
Medical Profession Encourages Abortion of Fetuses with Down Syndrome, 24 ISSUES L. & MED. 
3, 3–4 (2008) [hereinafter Dixon, Informed Consent] (discussing the effect direct and indirect 
influences of medical professionals have on the termination of fetuses with Down syndrome). 
 121. See, e.g., Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 963–64 (discussing the effects parents’ 
overbearing expectations have on their children).  
 122. Id. at 935–37 (arguing that “advancing technologies and cultural norms may exert a 
coercive effect on individuals’ reproductive choices”). 
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Suter underscores one of the “key criticisms” of neoeugenics under a 
relational autonomy analysis—many reproductive decisions are motivated 
by “prejudice and stereotypes of different groups.”123 “Majority views 
regarding disabilities often reflect the able-bodied’s misperceptions and 
stereotypes about the experiences of the disabled, in large part because of 
lack of experience with the disabled community.”124 For example, despite 
the reality that “many individuals with Down [s]yndrome can become semi-
independent and with good medical care, can live into adulthood,” 90 
percent of all babies diagnosed with Down syndrome are aborted125 due 
primarily to the “direct and indirect influences of medical professionals.”126 
Thus, rather than being motivated by accurate information, many mothers 
choose to terminate their pregnancies due to a doctor’s own stereotype and 
lack of experience treating children with Down Syndrome.127 Unlike the 
atomistic conception of autonomy, analysis under a relational autonomy 
approach must not only consider whether or not the woman has accurate 
information, but also the effect of the woman’s action in relationship to her 
community.128 
By choosing to terminate a fetus with an unwanted genetic condition or 
trait, the woman “defines the ‘unfit’ in terms of that [condition] or trait,” 
which “may devalue the lives of those with the trait.”129 Those in the 
disability movement have long recognized that social barriers create 
disability and “that the difficulties of living as a disabled person are due to 
discrimination and prejudice, rather than impairment.”130 Exemplifying this 
 
 123. Id. at 955. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Amy Harmon, Prenatal Testing Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y. TIMES, May 
9, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09down.html?ex=1336363200&en= 
ccf8eef18ff478e4&ei=5088. 
 126. See Dixon, Informed Consent, supra note 120, at 3–4. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955–57. Suter argues that those who we 
chose to terminate via abortion in some sense labels who society as a whole considers disabled or 
unwanted. In the case of genetic engineering, those traits we choose to enhance exclude certain 
traits and individuals, and may have a corrosive effect on how society views those persons with 
traits that are selected against. Thus, when making reproductive decisions women are not only 
affecting their own bodies and the life of their child, but they are also shaping their community.  
 129. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955. See also Robert Wachbroit, What is 
Wrong with Eugenics?, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: AN ANTHOLOGY 334 
(Edward Erwin et al. eds., 1994) (stating that what is “prima facie wrong” with using sex selection 
to select males “is that it insults the dignity of women; it demeans the value of being female”); 
Mary B. Mahowald, Aren't We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul Lombardo’s “Taking 
Eugenics Seriously”, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 230–34 (2003) (noting that expressivists argue 
that prenatal testing sends the message to people with disabilities that their lives are not worth 
living). 
 130. Tom Shakespeare, Eugenics, Genetics and Disability Equality, 13 DISABILITY & SOC'Y 
665, 669 (1998). See also Adrienne Asch, The Human Genome and Disability Rights, DISABILITY 
RAG AND RESOURCE, Jan.–Feb. 1994, at 12 (arguing that the premise of the disability rights 
movement is that persons with disabilities are disadvantaged far more by negative social attitudes 
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principle is the fact that deafness is viewed as a minor problem rather than a 
major misfortune in communities where deafness is common.131 The fact 
that those with disabilities are impaired much more by social prejudice and 
value judgments than by their actual disability highlights the role that 
individual value judgments play in shaping who and what we call 
“disabled.”132 Hence, relational autonomists are right to be concerned about 
the effects genetic engineering and in vitro fertilization may have on those 
who have traits that are selected against.133 
2. Genetic Plastic Surgery  
Analysis of genetic engineering must hinge on the nature of the human 
embryo. If a human embryo is merely an object of action, then genetic 
enhancements of it are morally neutral.134 But if the human embryo is both a 
subject and an object of action, then it is a human person and, whenever 
human persons are the object of our actions, we must never use them as a 
mere means to achieve our own ends.135 If an embryo were simply an 
object, then it would make no sense to discuss how genetic enhancements 
might broaden its autonomous life choices—much like it makes no sense to 
discuss how reupholstering a chair would broaden its autonomous life 
choices. Since genetic engineering is aimed at providing the embryo with 
broader potentiality with regard to the types of choices it will eventually be 
able to make, those who advocate for genetic engineering must believe that 
the embryo is not merely an object, but in some sense, it must also be a 
subject—the kind of entity that is capable of making choices. Thus, genetic 
engineering must presuppose the existence of a human person and as a 
result the embryo cannot be used as a mere means to achieve an end.136  
Those who support genetic engineering as a fundamental reproductive 
right argue that parents should have the right to equip their children with 
certain traits to enhance their potential for success and for making 
 
than by their disabilities). In a more recent case, Sarah Palin (the 2008 Republican U.S. Vice-
Presidential nominee) knowingly had a Down syndrome baby: Trig. Citing the effect Plain’s 
decision would have on society’s conception of Down syndrome should she get elected, a doctor 
in Canada worried that fewer Downs babies would be aborted. See John Flynn, Unlikely to 
Survive, ZENIT, Sep. 21, 2008, http://www.zenit.org/article-23672?l=english. 
 131. See Bob Sapey, From Stigma to the Social Exclusion of Disabled People, in STIGMA AND 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN HEALTHCARE 270 (Tom Mason et al. eds., 2001) (noting that relatives and 
friends value individuals with disabilities for qualities other than their impairments; however, to 
outsiders, individuals with disabilities continue to illicit negative responses). 
 132. Cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 956. 
 133. Cf. id.  
 134. Cf. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 25–27. Wojtyla argues that it is precisely because man 
is an object and a subject that we ought to not to use him as a means to our own ends. Id. Thus, the 
moral implications of how we use a fetus change depending on whether or not they are merely an 
object or if they are also a subject. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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autonomous life choices.137 Some supporters, like Professor Dworkin, make 
moral claims for a right to genetic engineering.138 Professor Dworkin bases 
his moral claim on two principles. First, that “it is objectively important that 
any human life, once begun, succeed rather than fail,” and second, every 
person has the right to “define, for him, what a successful life would be.”139 
I agree with both principles; however, since the goal of genetic engineering 
is to allow parents to choose cosmetic, intellectual, and physiological 
enhancements for their child before the child is even born, the only types of 
genetic engineering that fit into Dworkin’s analysis are preventative 
measures aimed at curing diseases.140 Since each person should “define, for 
him, what a successful life would be,”141 there is no moral argument for 
cosmetic enhancements because it is impossible to know what the 
autonomous life choices of an embryo would be before he or she is born.142  
Decisions to provide cosmetic enhancements for a child, therefore, must 
only be motivated by life choices that the parents themselves would have 
chosen.143 This phenomenon is already taking place in field of plastic 
surgery.144 Motivated by their own conceptions of beauty and social 
 
 137. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92 (rev. ed. 1999) (explaining that a rational 
actor wants to ensure that her descendants have the capabilities to pursue their preferred plans of 
life. Because enhancing a child’s natural talents neither infringes on others’ liberty nor makes 
anyone worse off, “society is to take steps at least to preserve the general level of natural abilities 
and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects.”). 
 138. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 
449, 452 (2000). 
 139. Id. at 448–49. (Finding a moral obligation for genetic engineering from two principles: 
first, “it is objectively important that any human life, once begun, succeed rather than fail,” and 
second, every person has the right to “define, for him, what a successful life would be.” Given 
these two precepts, society should have no qualms about enhancing the capabilities of its children 
so that they may have a greater choice of life paths and better odds at succeeding at whatever they 
choose to do. Indeed, morality requires that society do so.”). 
 140. For example, parents who want their children to be athletic can equip the embryo with the 
genetic material that will make the child taller, faster, stronger, and essentially more athletic. 
Thus, the fetus is an objectively tall, fast, strong, and athletic human person. 
 141. DWORKIN, supra, note 138, at 449. 
 142. Except perhaps to the extent that G.K. Chesterton explored them in his poem By the Babe 
Unborn. See G.K. Chesterton, By the Babe Unborn, in STORIES, ESSAYS, AND POEMS 278 (2007). 
 143. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 963. Suter discusses a Real Housewives of 
Orange County episode in which a teenager whose father and grandfather were professional 
baseball players is raised with the constant message that he has the genes for baseball and an 
obligation to fulfill his family’s dreams of his becoming another professional player. Ironically, 
the pressure to focus solely on baseball results in the son’s poor academic performance and 
inability to play baseball on his high school team his senior year, which ultimately harmed his 
drafting potential. This part of Suter’s paper influenced the title of my paper. “Stage mom 
syndrome” is an idiom referring to a parent living out their own frustrated desires through their 
children. The idea is that when genetically engineering a child, parents will choose life choices for 
their children that resemble their own life choices and in the case of unattained goals parents can 
take steps to ensure their children succeed where they failed.  
 144. Sandra Boodman, For More Teenage Girls, Adult Surgery: Rise in Breast Implants, 
Other Procedures, Raises Doubts About Long Term Effects, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at 
A1. Rhinoplasty remains the number one procedure for teenage girls. Boodman suggests that the 
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pressures, there are a disturbing number of parents electing plastic surgery 
for their teenage daughters—girls as young as fourteen are receiving breast 
augmentations, rhinoplasty, and liposuction.145 Since genetic engineering 
would allow parents to equip their children with cosmetic enhancements, 
the demand for genetic plastic surgery is likely to be as high or even higher 
than the demand for plastic surgery. But unlike plastic surgery, genetic 
plastic surgery will hinge on only the parents’ conception of the good. 
Therefore, to the extent that parents will use genetic engineering to 
manufacture children they conceive to be valuable, genetic engineering 
does violence to the autonomy of the child by treating the embryo as a mere 
means to achieve the parents’ ends. In essence, the parents substitute their 
will for that of the child.146  
Under an atomistic autonomy approach, genetic engineering may result 
in fostering prejudice and stereotypes.147 Allowing parents to choose 
desirable genetic traits for their children may result in the devaluing of 
those persons without those traits. Much like plastic surgery, genetic 
engineering will result in homogeneous trait selections,148 which could send 
a message to those who opt out of genetic engineering that they are 
abnormal.149 Therefore, to the extent that genetic engineering will be used 
to cosmetically enhance a child’s future, it should be regulated.  
Regulation of genetic engineering and similar neoeugenic procedures 
turns on whether (1) such procedures are likely to be considered 
fundamental rights; and if they are, whether (2) there is a compelling state 
interest to defeat a due process challenge.  
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE OF NEOEUGENICS  
There is a constant tension between the extent to which the state can 
compel action against individual freedom and the extent to which the state 
can prevent action in accordance with individual freedom. This tension is 
usually solved using a “compelling state interest” test.150 Should the 
 
increase in teenage plastic surgery is due to the popularity of reality shows such as “Extreme 
Makeover,” “The Swan,” and “I Want a Famous Face”. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Cf. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 21.  
 147. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 956. 
 148. In plastic surgery, no one chooses to make themselves fatter, or their noses bigger, 
breasts smaller (the result of those persons who have breast reduction is not smaller breasts but 
more comfortable large breasts); the choices reflected in plastic surgery are for the most part 
homogeneous. See also Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 960; cf., Dixon, Informed 
Consent, supra note 120, at 3–4 (discussing how those with Down syndrome are selected against, 
thus, limiting their communal population).  
 149. The pressure on young girls to have plastic surgery is only one example. An alarming 
number of teenagers opt to go under the knife because of the perception that they do not fit in. The 
same analogy is true of genetic engineering. 
 150. See, e.g., Regulating, supra note 9, at 1589. 
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technology ever advance to the point where parents can, in fact, engineer 
their own children, there are two compelling interests which will justify the 
regulation of such technology: the autonomy of the patient and the 
autonomy of the child.  
A. Neoeugenics as a Fundamental Reproductive Right 
An unsigned Note in the Harvard Law Review argues that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends a person’s liberty 
interest to include neoeugenic programs such as in vitro fertilization and 
genetic engineering.151 The Supreme Court has already determined that a 
woman has a fundamental reproductive right to decide when to have a 
child. For example, a woman has a reproductive right of “procreation 
without state interference,”152 the right to decide when to get pregnant,153 
and the right to terminate a pregnancy.154 At least one district court 
determined that a woman has a right to prenatal testing.155 The Supreme 
Court may soon have to determine whether women have a fundamental 
reproductive right to in vitro fertilization.156 
John Robertson argues in favor of a fundamental right to in vitro 
fertilization, remarking that “if bearing, begetting, or parenting children is 
protected as part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should be 
protected whether they are achieved coitally or noncoitally.”157 He therefore 
would extend those constitutionally-protected liberties to in vitro 
fertilization and other reproductive enhancing technologies.158  
But abortion, contraception, prenatal testing, and in vitro fertilization 
focus on the extent to which the constitution protects a woman’s right to 
decide when and if to have a child. The question of whether these 
protections extend to the sort of child she will have (e.g., preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis and genetic engineering) remains. 
 
 151. Id. at 1578. 
 152. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942)). 
 153. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 154. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the state cannot restrict 1st trimester 
abortions); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (finding that the state cannot restrict 
abortions into the 2nd and 3rd trimesters). But see Gonzalez v Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) 
(limiting Steinberg in that a woman’s reproductive right does not extend to dilation and extraction 
(intact dilation) procedures). 
 155. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (citing Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 
1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a woman’s constitutional right to abort her fetus must also 
include a right to prenatal testing to give the woman information on which to make the decision to 
abort or not). 
 156. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 950; cf. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587. 
 157. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 39 (Princeton University Press 1994). See also Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 
2, at 950. 
 158. See Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 950. 
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The Note argues that the constitution already protects a woman’s right 
to determine the sort of child she will have.159 For example, “it would 
almost certainly be unconstitutional for the state to prohibit citizens from 
dating eugenically.”160 In addition to eugenic dating, at least one federal 
district court has already determined that a woman has a substantive due 
process right to screen her fetus for genetic abnormalities.161 And since Roe, 
“eugenic abortions” are also protected.162 But these rights do not necessarily 
establish a constitutional right for a woman to decide what sort of child she 
will have; they only establish a woman’s right to decide what sort of child 
she will not have.163  
Advocates will nevertheless defend genetic engineering as a 
fundamental reproductive right by combining three separate rights already 
recognized by the Supreme Court.164 The first is the right to procreation 
without state interference.165 The second is the right “to direct the 
upbringing and education of one’s children,”166 including giving them 
advantages not available to all.167 The third right is “the guarantee of marital 
privacy, which extends ‘to activities relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.’”168 
 
 159. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1588. 
 160. Id. at 1586. The Note describes eugenic dating as dating with the goal of finding a mate 
who will provide desirable genes for one’s offspring, whether such genes are for hair color or for 
intelligence. I do not find this evidence compelling. While I agree that regulations on “eugenic 
dating” would be unconstitutional, they would be unconstitutional for many other reasons than the 
neoeugenic characteristics, such as individual liberty. The inference from eugenic dating is 
weakened by the fact that many states restrict who can legally marry. For example, siblings cannot 
marry, in large part, due to the genetic abnormalities that would result from such a union. In so far 
as eugenic dating is posited to prove that the state is constitutionally forbidden from regulating the 
types of couples who are having children, the fact that diseugenic unions (like that of brother to 
sister) are regulated reveals that the state cannot prevent people from dating but they can decide 
the types of relationships that will receive state benefits. This may be a type of indirect regulation.  
 161. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (citing Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 
1376–77 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a woman’s constitutional right to abort her fetus must also 
include a right to prenatal testing to give the woman information on which to make the decision to 
abort or not). 
 162. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587 (describing instances where women chose to abort after 
finding out their fetus will be born with a serious genetic disease. These abortions are referred to 
as “eugenic abortions”). 
 163. Even eugenic dating does not allow a person to determine what sort of child they will 
have because there are innumerable ways that genes may combine. Therefore, eugenic dating—at 
best—only gives a person better odds for the desired characteristics of the child. 
 164. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88. 
 165. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 
(1977)); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 166. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925)); accord Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 167. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1587–88 (citing John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of 
Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 424, n.12 (1996); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972)). 
 168. Regulating, supra note 9, at 1588 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 
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This last right, when combined with the previous two rights, creates the 
constitutional foundation upon which a right to genetically engineer a child 
might be found to exist. All of these rights have their foundation on what 
the Supreme Court considers to be “central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.”169  
The extent to which genetic engineering will be found to fall within the 
liberty interests of the due process clause remains to be seen. Perhaps the 
Court will agree with John Robertson that genetic engineering may “deviate 
[so much] from the core interests that make reproduction meaningful as to 
fall outside the protective canopy of protective liberty.”170 Assuming 
arguendo that neoeugenic programs fall within the protective canopy of the 
due process clause, any attempt to regulate them will be subject to a 
“compelling state interest” test.171  
B. Two Compelling Interests  
Finding a compelling state interest in regulating some types of 
neoeugenic procedures may be more difficult than it seems. In Lawrence v. 
Texas, the Supreme Court rejected morality and ethics as the only 
compelling state interests justifying the regulation of a liberty interest.172 
There, a compelling state interest must do something more than reflect mere 
moral disapproval.173 Moral disapproval aside, one can imagine all sorts of 
interests a state may have in regulating neoeugenics. For example, the state 
may have a compelling interest in regulating the health of the embryos and 
their mothers.174 The state could regulate neoeugenics using its police 
powers to the extent that neoeugenic procedures will be harmful to public 
welfare or health.175  
The state also has an interest in regulating neoeugenic procedures to the 
extent that they are motivated by and promote discrimination.176 Allowing a 
narrowly-tailored state affirmative action program, the Supreme Court has 
 
(1997); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)). 
 169. Planned Parenthood of S. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 170. ROBERTSON, supra note 157, at 34; cf. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 949–50 
(“The Supreme Court has explicitly treated parenting decisions concerning education, religion, 
and procreation as constitutionally protected interests, describing them as “involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy . . . . Whether they include all manner of neoeugenic reproductive decisions 
remains to be seen.”). 
 171. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1589. 
 172. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003)). 
 173. 539 U.S. at 585. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., David M. Nelson, The Police Powers: A Pretext for Protectionism?, 32 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 163, 164 (2004). 
 176. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325, 343 (2003) (noting a compelling state interest 
in racial diversity). 
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found a compelling state interest in promoting a “cross-racial 
understanding.”177 Similarly, in striking down a Seattle student allocation 
plan based on race, the Supreme Court has nevertheless affirmed the state’s 
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation.178 In the same vein, since 
genetic engineering fosters discrimination against less genetically perfect 
human beings, regulations of some neoeugenic programs—like genetic 
engineering—could survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge if the 
Court finds a compelling interest in avoiding genetic isolation or 
discrimination.179  
Given the Court’s emphasis on the liberty interests of the due process 
clause—namely personal autonomy180—two interests are particularly 
compelling.  
1. Patient Autonomy  
Patients undergoing procedures such as genetic engineering, gene 
therapy, and even amniocentesis are owed a degree of personal autonomy 
with regard to medical decisions—especially reproductive decisions.181 Yet 
as discussed supra, there are numerous social pressures and remnants of 
crypto-eugenics which impair true patient autonomy. Professor Suter 
believes that “[perhaps] the greatest social pressure is the view that one 
should undergo prenatal testing and screening because it is in the best 
interests of one’s future child.”182 “In some cases, patients actually believe 
they have no choice with regard to prenatal testing or screening.”183 Yet 
prenatal testing is not without its limitations. Although doctors frequently 
refer to prenatal testing as a “treatment” or “doing what’s best,” prenatal 
testing often “merely ‘prevents disease’ by preventing the existence of 
someone with the disease.”184 
A study in California (where doctors are required to offer prenatal 
testing) revealed that doctors are “more interested in persuading [patients to 
 
 177. Id. at 330. 
 178. Parents Involved in Community Schools. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783, 
797–98 (2007). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy affirmed the necessity of diverse 
public schools, however, such diversity should not be limited to race alone but also to cultural and 
economic diversity. 
 179. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1590. The Note points out that “congress is probably 
within its power to ban the genetic modification of a child's racial phenotype and might be within 
its power to outlaw sex selection.” Id. at 1590. The legitimate state interest is more convincing 
because race and sex are recognized constitutional classes. As genetic engineering becomes 
mainstream and less desirable genes are more frequently discriminated against, the compelling 
interest becomes more convincing for other classes of persons. 
 180. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 181. See Regulating, supra note 9, at 1586–89.  
 182. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 924. 
 183. Suter, Routinization, supra note 77, at 255. 
 184. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 924. 
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undergo prenatal testing] . . . than informing patients.”185 The American 
Medical Association is well aware that in many cases, what seem to be 
autonomous choices are really influenced by crypto-eugenics.186 For 
example, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs’ report to the AMA 
revealed that, while “overt eugenics” is not a potential threat, “the aggregate 
result of individual choices creates societal and cultural norms which 
substantially influence or limit the scope of autonomous decision making in 
regard to the use of genetic technology.”187 While state-mandated prenatal 
testing does not yet occur, the California study reveals that state-compelled 
offers of prenatal testing, when combined with a policy of crypto-eugenics, 
achieve substantially the same goals as a mandated testing program.188  
Given this evidence, a regulation requiring doctors to adopt a non-
directive approach to genetic counseling will succeed a due process 
challenge in order to preserve patient autonomy.  
2. Autonomy of the Fetus 
In a post-Roe era, discussing the autonomy of a fetus may seem odd. 
After all, the Court in Roe v. Wade refused to opine on whether the fetus 
was a human person, implying that the autonomy of the mother trumped 
that of the fetus.189 As discussed supra, the right of a woman to decide what 
child she will not have and the right to decide the sort of child she will have 
are fundamentally different. A right to abortion concerns the former, while 
a right to genetically engineer a child concerns the later.  
To the extent that a woman has decided to carry a child to term, the 
fetus’s autonomy becomes increasingly relevant. Since arguments for 
genetic engineering as a fundamental right assume that the fetus is alive, 
there is a compelling interest in protecting the fetus’ autonomy. Dworkin 
argues that, “it is objectively important that any human life, once begun, 
succeed rather than fail” and that every person has the right to “define, for 
him, what a successful life would be.”190 The only way for a fetus to define 
for himself what a successful life would be, is to protect the fetus from 
cosmetic enhancements imposed on him by his parents. Allowing parents to 
 
 185. Nancy Anne Press & Carole H. Browner, Collective Silences, Collective Fictions: How 
Prenatal Diagnostic Testing Became Part of Routine Prenatal Care, in WOMEN AND PRENATAL 
TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 201, 216, 216 n.10 (Karen H. 
Rothenberg & Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994). 
 186. AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CEJA REPORT A – A-
91: ETHICAL ISSUES IN CARRIER SCREENING OF CYSTIC FIBROSIS AND OTHER GENETIC 
DISORDERS (1991) 10–11, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_aa91.pdf. 
 187. Id. at 11. 
 188. Press & Browner, supra note 185, at 216 n.10. The study showed that 85% of women in 
California chose to have prenatal testing compared with the national average of 65%.  
 189. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 190. DWORKIN, supra note 89, at 448–49. 
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cosmetically enhance their children does violence to their autonomy 
because it substitutes the parent’s will for the child’s.191 Thus, the state has 
a compelling interest in ensuring that a child can define, for itself, what a 
successful life would be,” and can, therefore, prohibit cosmetic 
enhancements through neoeugenic procedures like genetic engineering.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Neoeugenics is motivated by many of the same prejudices and value 
judgments that motivated the classic eugenics era. If Professor Suter is 
right, that reproductive decisions in the neoeugenic era are motivated by 
“prejudice and stereotypes of different groups,”192 then there is no moral 
difference between a state’s decision to eradicate genetic “defectives” and 
an individual’s decision to eliminate an undesirable genetic trait based on 
the same stereotypes and biases. The coercive desire to eliminate 
genetically inferior life turned the classic eugenics movement into a 
monster that devoured ten million “undesirable” Jews. This same desire has 
led to a modern holocaust of genetic undesirables, especially in the case of 
Down syndrome. The neoeugenics movement must learn from its 
catastrophic forerunner. States should enact laws that require medical 
professionals and genetic counselors to take a nondirective approach when 
advising patients during prenatal testing, genetic engineering, and gene 
therapy in order to avoid value judgments about what constitutes a desirable 
life. States should also prohibit the cosmetic enhancement of fetuses. 
Neoeugenics is not all bad. Due to advancements in science, it offers 
some very promising means of enhancing the quality of a person’s life.193 
Researching genetic cures and treatments for disorders should be vigorously 
encouraged. But, because we make decisions in relationship to other people, 
we should be cautious about how our pursuit of neoeugenic procedures 
affects the personal autonomy of others. To the extent that the Supreme 
Court would rely on an argument in favor of neoeugenic programs, like 
genetic engineering, based on personal autonomy, the Court should not only 
weigh how a regulation affects the autonomy of the parents seeking a 
neoeugenic benefit, but also consider how the neoeugenic benefit would 
affect the fetus—namely, respect the fetus’ own subjective ends.  
Since we can never know what would have been better for a child, the 
Court should allow neoeugenic programs linked to an objective good to the 
fetus. Those goods which are unknown, or are reflections of the parent’s 
own subjective desires, like cosmetic enhancements, should not be 
permitted because it does violence to the very nature of the fetus—it treats 
 
 191. WOJTYLA, supra note 104, at 24. 
 192. Suter, Designer Babies, supra note 2, at 955. 
 193. Id. at 932–34 (discussing the potential of gene therapy and gene transfer). 
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the fetus as a mere means to an end. Cosmetic or physiological 
enhancements are not permissible because the ends of the embryo are never 
known. However, since the most basic good of all creatures is existence, 
genetic engineering is permissible only to the extent that it is used to sustain 
a child’s most basic good—life.  
 
